In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TUgames using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payo s change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by this fairness property, e ciency and the null player property. These three axioms also characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games, such as the class of simple games or the class of apex games.
Introduction
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payo s by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility {or simply a TU-game{ being a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set of players and v: 2 N ! IR is a characteristic function such that v(;) = 0. Since we take the set of players N to be xed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function v. The collection of all characteristic functions on N is denoted by G N . A (single valued) solution for TU-games is a function f: G N ! IR N which assigns an jNj-dimensional real vector to every TU-game. This vector can be seen as a distribution of the payo s that can be obtained by cooperation over the individual players in the game. A famous solution is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a) ). Various axiomatizations of the Shapley value have been given. In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using e ciency, the null player property and a fairness property. This last property states that if to a game v 2 G N we add a game w 2 G N in which players i and j are symmetric then the payo s of players i and j change by the same amount, i.e., if w(S fig) = w(S fjg) for all S N n fi; jg then f i (v + w) ? f i (v) = f j (v + w) ? f j (v).
This concept of fairness is related to fairness as introduced by Myerson (1977) for games in which the possibilities of coalition formation in a TU-game are limited because of the fact that players are part of a limited communication structure. In that model fairness means that deleting a communication relation between two players has the same e ect on both their payo s. A similar fairness axiom is used in van den Brink (1997) for games in which the cooperation possibilities in a TU-game are limited because the players are part of a hierarchical permission structure in which there are players who need permission from certain other players before they are allowed to cooperate. In that model fairness means that deleting a permission relation between two players has the same e ect on both their payo s. In van den Brink (1995a) a fairness axiom for relational power measures for directed graphs 1 is introduced. In that context fairness means that deleting a relation between two nodes in a digraph changes their relational power by the same amount.
As already noted by Dubey (1975) , axiomatizations of the Shapley value on G N not necessarily characterize the Shapley value on important subclasses of games such as the class of simple games. A TU-game v is simple if v(S) 2 f0; 1g for all S N.
It turns out that e ciency, the null player property, and fairness also characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. Van den Brink (1995a) shows that these three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the even smaller class of apex games.
Besides the literature on fairness started in Myerson (1977) , this paper also is related to the axiomatization of the Shapley value by e ciency, symmetry and strong monotonicity given in Young (1985) . A solution satis es strong monotonicity if for every pair of games v; w 2 G N and i 2 N, the payo of i in v is at least equal to its payo in w if the marginal contribution of player i to any coalition in v is at least equal to its corresponding marginal contribution in w, i.e., f i (v) we add a game in which this player is a null player, while fairness compares the change in payo of two players if we add a game in which these players are symmetric.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we de ne fairness and show that the Shapley value is the unique solution on G N that satis es e ciency, the null player property and fairness. We also show that these three axioms characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. We end Section 2 by comparing fairness with strong monotonicity and balanced contributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mass-Colell (1989) . In Section 3 we generalize the characterization of the Shapley value to weighted Shapley values as considered in, e.g., Shapley (1953b) and Kalai and Samet (1987) . Finally, there is an appendix that discusses components in TU-games which are used in the proof of the main theorem.
An axiomatization of the Shapley value
In this section we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value using e ciency, the null player property and fairness. The Shapley value (Shapley (1953a) ) is the function It is easy to verify that every solution that satis es symmetry and additivity also sat- 
where the rst and sixth equality follow from additivity, and the third equality follows from symmetry of f. Thus, f satis es fairness.
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It is known that the Shapley value is characterized by e ciency, the null player property, symmetry and additivity. By Proposition 2.4 it thus also satis es fairness. A solution that satis es fairness need not satisfy symmetry nor additivity. This can be seen from Clearly, this property implies e ciency and the null player property. However, e ciency and the null player property do not imply component e ciency. A solution that satis es e ciency and the null player property, but does not satisfy component e ciency is the normalized Banzhaf value as characterized in van den Brink and van der Laan (1998 
With e ciency it follows that 
Similarly, it follows that f i (v) = c H jHj for all i 2 H. So, f(v) is also uniquely determined in this case.
3. Suppose that T \ H = ; and T H = N. Note that d(v) = 2 implies that jNj 2. We distinguish the following two cases with respect to jNj:
A. We rst consider the case that jNj 3. Suppose without loss of generality that jTj 2. Take a j 2 T and h 2 H. coalitions from player i to player j such that every coalition in this sequence has a nonempty intersection with its neighbouring coalitions. A coalition B N is a maximal connected coalition in v 2 G N if and only if the following two conditions are satis ed: (i) for every i; j 2 B it holds that i and j are connected in v; (ii) for every i 2 B and j 2 N n B it holds that i and j are not connected in v.
For a discussion of connected coalitions we refer to the appendix of this paper.
Proof of Theorem 2.5
It is well-known that the Shapley value satis es e ciency and the null player property. Since the Shapley value satis es symmetry and additivity, it follows from Propositon 2.4 that it also satis es fairness. Now, suppose that f: G N ! IR N satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness. Let v 2 G N .
We show that f(v) is uniquely determined by induction on the number d(v) (de ned in equation (1) Suppose that f j (v) = c for some value c 2 IR. Next we determine for every i 2 N n fjg the value f i (v) as a function of c by the following procedure:
Step 1 Let k = 1 and c j = 0 (and thus f j (v) = c + c j ). Goto Step 2.
Step 2 By de nition of the set T k , for every i 2 T k there exists an h 2 S k?1 l=0 T l and a T N such that T fi; hg and v (T) 6 = 0.
With the induction hypothesis and the fact that we already determined the value c h 2 IR for which f h (v) = c + c h this yields that
where c i :
Step 3.
Step 3 If k = m then Stop. Else let k = k + 1. Goto Step 2. Thus, there can be at most one solution f: G N ! IR N that satis es e ciency, the null player property, and fairness. Since the Shapley value satis es these axioms, f must be equal to the Shapley value.
The independence of the three axioms of Theorem 2.5 can be illustrated by the following three well-known solutions: As noted by Dubey (1975) , axioms that caharacterize the Shapley value on G N need not characterize the Shapley value on the class of simple games. A TU-game v 2 G N is a simple game if v(S) 2 f0; 1g for all S N. However, e ciency, the null player property, and fairness do characterize the Shapley value on the class G N S which consists of all simple games on N. If we restrict ourselves to G N S then e ciency and the null player property are required only for simple games. Fairness is required for pairs of simple games v; w 2 G N S for which the sum game (v + w) also is a simple game. Next we determine f(b T ) by the following procedure:
Step 1 Let H 0 = N n T, k = 0, v 0 = u T , and c 0 = 1 jTj (and thus f i (v 0 ) = c 0 for all i 2 T and f i (v 0 ) = 0 for all i 2 H 0 ). Goto Step 2.
Step 2 Applying fairness to u T and v k+1 then also yields that f i (v k+1 ) = f j (v k+1 ) for all i 2 N n (T H k ).
So,
Since c k+1 is the only unkown, e ciency uniquely determines c k+1 , and thus f(v k+1 ). Goto Step 3.
Step 3 Let k = k + 1 and H k = H k?1 n fjg. Goto Step 2.
By this procedure we have determined f(b T ).
If d s (v) = 2 then v = b T + b H for some T; H N; T 6 = H, and f(v) is determined in a way similar as the case d(v) = 2 in the proof of Lemma 2.6, but with the role of unanimity games replaced by standard games. Besides replacing unanimity games by standard games, we also should avoid the null player property since this property cannot be used in this case. We do this as follows. In the case T \ H 6 = ;, assume without loss of generality that T nH 6 = ;. Take an h 2 T nH. For every i 2 N n(T H),
Since f i (b T ) and f h (b T ) are known, and f h (v) is expressed as c plus a known constant, we also have expressed f i (v) as c plus a known constant. E ciency, again determines c , and thus f(v) is determined.
In a similar way the null player property can be avoided in case T \ H = ;; T H 
For the smaller class of apex games, van den Brink (1995a) shows that e ciency, the null player property and fairness characterize the Shapley value on this class of games. The apex game a j;J , j 2 N, J N n fjg, assigns the value one to every coalition that either contains J or contains the apex player j and at least one player from J. All other coalitions are assigned the value zero. This fairness property for apex games states that making a non-apex player a null player changes the payo s of this non-apex player and the apex player by the same amount if jJj 2, i.e., f i (a j;J ) ? f i (a j;Jnfig ) = f j (a j;J ) ? f j (a j;Jnfig ) for all i 2 J, jJj 2.
Although the purpose of this paper is to characterize the Shapley value on classes of games with xed player set N, we conclude this section by comparing fairness with the concept of balanced contributions as considered in, e.g., Myerson (1980) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) . This property is stated for games with variable sets of players. In order to state this property, we therefore denote in this paragraph a TU-game as a pair (N; v) , and by G we denote the collection of all TU-games. It is easy to verify that the egalitarian rule satis es fairness 5 but does not have balanced contributions. Under the assumptions that a solution f on G satis es single player e ciency 6 and permutation neutrality 7 it holds that f satis es fairness if it has balanced contributions. Proposition 2.9 If f is a solution for TU-games that satis es single player e ciency, permutation neutrality and has balanced contributions, then f satis es fairness. 4 For convenience we write f(N; v) instead of f ((N; v) ). 5 Here fairness is de ned on the class G in a straightforward manner. 6 A solution f on G satis es single player e ciency if it is e cient for all 1-player games, i.e. Thus, the sum of the payo s that are assigned to the players in N is equal to the worth v(N) irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players. Similarly, a null player always gets a zero payo , irrespective of the weights. We generalize fairness in the following way. Sh w if and only if it satis es -e ciency, the -null player property, and -fairness.
The proof is obtained by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 in a straightforward way (in particular, the use of fairness), and is therefore omitted.
Another type of weighted Shapley value has been considered in Kalai and Samet (1987) . Thus, the sum of the payo s that are assigned to the players in N again is equal to the worth v(N) irrespective of the weights that are assigned to the players and the way the players are ordered in the partition . Similarly, null players earn nothing irrespective of the weights and the ordering of the players in the partition .
Axiom 3.7 ( ; -fairness) Let 2 IR N ++ , = (S 1 ; : : : ; S m ) 2 S N , and let i 2 S k and j 2 S l , k; l 2 f1; : : : ; mg, be symmetric in w 2 G N . For every v 2 G N it holds
Again, by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.5 it can be shown that the KS-weighted Shapley value is the unique function f: G N IR N ++ S N ! IR N that satis es ; -e ciency, the ; -null player property, and ; -fairness.
Appendix: connected coalitions and components in TU-games
Maximal connected coalitions as used in the proof of Theorem 2.5 coincide with minimal components in TU-games. Components in TU-games are already considered in, e.g., Aumann and Dr eze (1974) and Chang and Kan (1994) 
